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1. Introduction
Moral hazard is defined to be a situation in which "one party
a transaction may undertake certain actions that (a) affect the
other party's valuation of the transaction but that (b) the second
party cannot monitor/enforce perfectly" (Kreps, p. 577) .
Unemployment insurance is a classic example of moral hazard the
government would like to provide a social safety net for those who
are currently jobless but seeking reemployment. Unfortunately, the
cannot monitor perfectly the effort put forth by the
unemployed to find new jobs. Thus, there is a tradeoff -- if the
government provides too much insurance, the unemployed will not
work hard enough to find new jobs, but, if too little insurance is
provided the unemployed will bear too much risk. In devising an
optimal unemployment insurance program, the government must find a
way to provide adequate insurance without sUbstantially reducing
the incentive to seek employment.
The current UI program in the U.s. provides a benefit equal to
roughly 50% of the wage earned on the previous job for one-half of
a year after a worker loses her job. There are at least four
relevant lines of literature that have been devoted to assessing
whether this program is structured correctly and ~hether' the
current level of generousity is adequate. The purpose of this
paper is to offer a brief critical review these literatures and to
extend our previous work (Davidson and Woodbury 1995) on this
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issue.
section
The paper divides into four
2, we rev iew three areas of
additional sections. In
the literature that deal
explicitly with the issue of unemployment insurance. section 3
provides a description of our model. Our previous results are
reviewed and our new results are presented in section 4. Finally,
in section 5 we relate our results to the previous literature,
compare them with insights that have been provided by the abstract
literature on optimal insurance contracts, and discuss future
extens ions. We close the paper with a conj ecture as to the
structure of an optimal unemployment program that is radically
different from the present system.
2. The Literature
There are at least four relevant strands of literature that
have investigated aspects of an optimal insurance program in the
presence of moral hazard. The first three -- labor economics,
macroeconomics, and pUblic economics -- use similar approaches.
They all adopt search models of the labor market in which
unemployed . workers choose search effort to maximize expected
utility. More generous unemployment insurance increases the
insurance offered to the unemployed, but also lowers optimal search
effort, thereby triggering an increase in unemployment. Although
the approaches are similar, these literatures seem to have
developed, for the most part, independently. Thus, it is not
surprising that they differ in the questions that are addressed,
the complexity of the models, and the assumptions that are used to
3
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simplify the analysis. The purpose of this section is to provide
a critical review of the contributions in each area.
In section 5, we review work in a related area -- the abstract
literature on optimal insurance contracts -- that does not directly·
deal with unemployment insurance. At that point,< we discuss how
the results from that related literature can be extended to provide
insights concerning an optimal unemployment insurance program. We
also combine the insights from the f.our literatures with own
results to derive an unemployment insurance program that is
fundamentally different from our current system, but which we
believe makes more sense than the current one from an economic
perspective.
A. Labor Economics
Perhaps the best known article on optimal unemployment
insurance in the labor economics literature is Shavell and Weiss'
1979 paper in the Journal of· Political. Economy. This article
addresses the following question -- given that the government is
going to spend a fixed amount of money on unemployment
compensation, how should the benefits be paid out to the
unemployed? That is, how should benefits vary over the spell of
unemployment? Note that this paper does not attempt to determine
the optimal size of the program -- the generousity of the program
is taken as given and fixed.
The authors consider a variety of models in order to indicate
how different features of the model affect their results. Their
4
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basic approach is similar to that described above in that they use
a search model of the labor market. However, in some of the cases
that they consider they do not allow agents to alter search effort.
This allows them characterize ·the optimal benefit path when moral
hazard is not an issue. When they do allow search effort to vary,
they assume that unemployed workers choose search effort to
maximize expected lifetime utility and that greater search effort,
while costly, increases the probability of finding employment. In
all of their models unemployed workers are assumed to be identical.
In addition, labor demand is not modeled and the wage rate is
exogenous and independent of the UI program adopted. Finally, in
each case, the benef it path over the spell of unemployment is
chosen to maximize the expected lifetime utility of a
representative unemployed 'worker.
Shavell and Weiss derive several results, depending on the
assumptions of their model. For our purposes, there are three
results that are important. The first result concerns the optimal
benefit path when workers (a) cannot save and (b) cannot alter
search effort so that they cannot affect their probability of
reemployment. Thus, workers cannot self-insure and there are no
moral hazard concerns. In this case, it is optimal to offer the
same benefit rate in each period of unemployment. The logic is
simple. Risk averse agents wish to smooth consumption across time.
If agents cannot save, the only way provide a smooth path of
consumption across the spell of unemployment is to make the benefit
independent of the number of weeks a 'worker has been unemployed.
5
CC-6
, if agents cannot affect the probability of finding employment,
are negative side effects of such a UI program.
The second resul t concerns the optimal benef it path when
can save but cannot. affect their probability of
loyment. Thus, self-insurance is possible, but there are
still no moral hazard issues to deal with. In this case, the
optimal benefit rate is lowest in the initial stages of
unemployment and rises over the spell of unempl,oyment. As the
spell lengthens, the benefit rate approaches an upper 'bound
asympototically. Thus, benef its are offered indef initely. The
intuition for this result is straightforward. If agents can save
while employed, then during the initial stages of unemployment they
can smooth consumption by dissaving. However, as the spell of
unemployment lengthens, savings are depleted, and the only way to
maintian consumption is for the government to increase the benefit
level. As before, if agents cannot affect their reemployment
probabilities, then their are no negative side effects from this
program.
Shavell and Weiss' last result describes the optimal benefit
path when agents can affect their probability of reemployment but
are unable to self-insure against employment risk. They shqw that
due to moral hazard concerns, benefits should decline over the
spell unemployment. The reduction in benefits induces workers to
put forth effort to become re~mployed. In the limit, the benefit
converges to zero.
Unfortunately, Shavell and Weiss are unable to characterize
6
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the optimal benefit path when agents can save and can also affect
their reemployment probabilities. However, the three resul ts
discussed above can be used to form a conjecture as to the optimal
benefit path in this case. with savings, agents can maintain
consumption in the early stages of unemployment without receiving
benef its. Thus, providing high benef its in the early stages of
unemployment would not be wise, since doing so would only serve to
lower search effort and increase unemployment. As the spell
lengthens and savings are depleted, the government must start to
increase benefits in order to allow the unemployed to smooth
consumption. However, increasing benefits too much or providing
them for too long would have an adverse effect on search effort and
unemployment. Thus, eventually the benef it rate must fall and
converge to zero (a typical benefit path of this nature is depicted
in Figure 1). It is important to emphasize that Shavell and Weiss'
analysis provides no insight as to the optimal level of benefits or
the point at which benef its should be' cut-off, they are only
concerned with the shape of the benefit path.
Several years after the pUblication of Shavell and Weiss,
Hausman (1984) argued that it was possible to improve upon the type
of DI program that they had advocated. He argued that by offering
a large up front payment to newly unemployed workers . followed by
low (or zero) benefits during the spell of unemployment, the system
would operate more efficiently. The reasoning behind this scheme
is that· the up front payment would provide the unemployed the funds
necessary to smooth consumption while the low benefit payments
7
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the spell of unemployment would provide a strong incentive
and accept reemployment. As in Shavell and Weiss, Hausman
no attempt to determine the optimal size of the initial
nor the optimal potential duration of benefits.
Both the Shavell and Weiss and Hausman analyses were largely
ical. There have also been two important recent empirical
igations of the current u.s. program in the labor economics
In 1994 O'Leary used a consumer theory approach to
imate the optimal benefit path. His basic finding was that with
current u. S. program short spells of unemployment are over-
while long spells are under-compensated. Note that
is result is similar to what one might conclude by comparing the
current system with Figure 1.
In an even more recent paper, Hamermesh and Slesnick (1995)
compare the well-being of Dr recip~intswith their counterparts who
do not receive benefits. They conclude that since their welfare
levels are similar, the current system provides the right level of
insurance.
with the exception of O'Leary (1994), all of these papers
attempt to analyze the UI system by focusing on its impact on the
typical unemployed UI recipient. While this may seem reasonable at
first, it ignores the costs of the program. If a more generous
program increases the unemployment rate, it increases the· tax
burden on the employed for two reasons. First, it costs more to
fund a more generous program. Second, with higher unemployment
there are fewer employed workers to share the tax burden. ThUS, it
8
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is important to investigate the impac,t of different programs on the
unemployment rate -- which is something that these papers do not
attemp~ to do. In short, these papers focus on the insurance
aspects of unemployment insuranc~ without paying adequate attention
to the costs of the program.
B. Macroeconomics
Over the past five years it has become fashionable in
macroeconomics to blame a large part of society's economic ills on
unemployment insurance. It is argued that the disincentive effect
of UI are so strong t~at they have lead toa significant increase
in the unemployment rate' throughout Europe (see, for example,
Layard, Nickell and Jackman 1991). Tnere hav~ also been claims that
the current u.s. unemployment'insurance program generates a large
welfare loss for the U.S economy (see, for example, Mortensen
1994) .
In a recent book, Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) trace
much of the recent Europeanexper ience, with unemployment to changes
in UI programs in the European countries. They arg~e that the
gradual increase in the "natural rate" of ,unemployment in several
European countries can be explained by the increased generousity of
their UI programs. 'In addition, they 'argue that much of the cross-
country differences in unemployment can be attributed to
differences in their VI programs. ,In fact, theY estimate that
approximately 91% of the variation in the, 1983-88 unemployment rate
averages across the major OECD industr~al countries can be
9
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lained by nothing more than the variation in the generousity of
market policies and the extent of collective bargaining
Based on their results, Layard et al suggest a variety of
to combat Europe's dual problems of high unemployment and
long average duration of unemployment. For example, with respect
to the U.K. they suggest reducing the unemployment benefit period,
discarding policies that impose firing costs on firms, and
instituting sUbsidies to offs.et recruiting and training costs
incurred by firms.
The purpose of the Layard, Nickell and Jackman book is to
provide estimates of the impact of various labor market policies on
unemployment and to suggest reforms. However, the authors make no
attempt to link the employment effects that they estimate to
measures of economic welfare. Thus , it is diff icult to assess
whether or not European UI programs are welfare enhancing or
debilitating. In addition, their analysis provides no guidance as
to how the reforms they suggest would improve matters when compared
to the present programs.
In two recent papers, Mortensen (1994) and Millard and
Mortensen (1994) attempt to improve on· the Layard et al approach by
estimating the welfare effects of a variety of labor market
pOlicies inclUding unemployment insurance. As opposed to the labor
economics literature, they use a general equilibrium search model
to carry out their analysis so as to capture the cost of UI through
its impact on the aggregate. unemployment rate. There are two
10
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primary reasons that DI generates economic costs (in addition to
the tax burden it creates). First, as we have already discussed,
more generous DI lowers the opportunity cost of unemployment
resulting in lower search effort by the jobless. This increases
the equilibrium rate of unemployment and reduces output. Second,
since more generous DI makes the unemployed less likely to accept
new jobs, the wage that firms must offer rises, making production
less profitable. This decreases the total number of jobs available
in the economy. This job destruction effect further lowers
employment, production, and welfare. This latter effect is absent
from all of the labor literature discussed in sub-section A since
the authors do not employ equilibrium models nor do they model firm
behavior.
For our purposes, the most important results from these papers
concern the UI programs in the u.s. and the U.K .. To estimate the
impact of these programs, the authors calibrate their model using
data on labor market flows in the U.S. during the period covering
1983-1992 and estimates of key parameters that are obtained from
the labor economics and macroeconomics literatures. Following
Layard et aI, they then recalibrate the model for the U.K. assuming
that differences in the U.S. and U.K. unemployment experiences can
be attributed to differences in their labor market policies and
union coverage rates.
In both papers welfare is measured by aggregate income net of
search, recruiting and training costs. with this. measure,
Mortensen (1994) estimates that a '50% reduction in the U.s.
11
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acement rate would reduce the equilibrium rate of unemployment
1.48 percentage points and increase net output by slightly less
one percentage point. He also estimates that a 50% reduction
the potential duration of benefits would decrease the
ilibrium rate of unemployment by .78 percentage points while
ing welfare by about .5 percentage points.
As for the U. K., Millard and Mortensen estimate that the
welfare cost imposed on the U. K. by its current UI program is
ly equal to 1.7% of net output, a fairly large measure for
dead weight loss. They also estimate that by limiting the benefit
period to 2 quarters (as in the U.S.), the U.K. could increase
welfare by more than one percentage point (and lower unemployment
by over 2 percentage points). Moreover, if the fir ing costs
currently imposed by the government were also eliminated (as
suggested by Layard et al), Mo~tensen and Millard estimate that
welfare in the U.K. would rise by as much as 3.5%.
It is easy to infer from these results that the current ui
programs in the u.S. and the U.K. impose significant welfare
burdens on their economies. However, there is at least one serious
drawback to these analyses. By using aggregate net income as their
measure of welfare, the authors implicitly assume risk neu~rality
on the part of workers so that there is no need or desire for
insurance of any kind. It follows that the positive aspects of UI
-- the fact that it provides ~esired insurance against employment
risk -- are given no weight in the welfare calculations. In
contrast to the labor literature which focused on the insurance
12
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aspects of UI without measuring the economic costs of the program,
these two papers focus on the costs of the program while ignoring
the benefits it provides.
A recent paper by Wang and· Williamson (1995) improves upon the
Mortensen and Millard and Mortensen analyses by explicilty
incorporating risk aversion into a general equilibrium model. In
that paper, welfare is measured by summing the utilities of all the
agents in the economy. Since each agent is risk averse, there is
a desire for employment insurance, and, since a general equilibrium
model is used, the authors are able to measure the impact of UI
programs on aggregate unemployment. Thus, Wang and Williamson use
an approach that measures both the benefits and costs of different
UI programs. It is important to note, however, that this is not
the only difference between the Millard/Mortensen and
Wang/Williamson papers -- Wang and Williamson do not adopt a search
framework, choosing to work instead in an abstract framework in
which the process by which jobs are created and destroyed are not
modelled. We discuss the importance of this difference in
approach in section 5.
The purpose of the Wang and Wil~iamson paper is to derive the
optimal unemployment insurance program assuming that the
replacement rate can vary over the spell of unemployment and that
the government can tax and/or subsidize transitions into various
labor market states. Thus, they allow for extremely complex
programs. In fact, the program that they find to be optimal is so
complex that it is hard to imagine any government actually ~rying
13
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implement it. In brief, they find that the replacement rate
ld v~ry non-monotonically with the spell of unemployment --
ing low and then rising before falling off eventually to zero.
, their optimal benefit path is similar to what we conjectured
optimal path would look like in the Shavell and Weiss analysis
agents can save and affect their reemployment probabilities
Figure 1). In addition, they find that the government should
idize transitions into employment (with, for example, a
loyment bonus).
Although Wang and Williamson use an approach that is quite
ifferent from ours (since they do not use a search model and do
not include firms in their analysis) and although their optimal DI
program is far more complex then any program that we allow the
government to consider, their results share many of the important
features of our optimal program. Therefore, in section 5 we
describe their results in greater detail and compare them with
ours.
C. Public Economics
The two most heavily cited papers on optimal unemployment
insurance appeared in the same 1978 issue of the Journal of Public
Economics. These papers were writt~n by Martin N. Baily and J.S.
Flemming and were so similar in approach and conclu~ions that .they
were given almost identical titles. Both authors use a search
model of the labor market in which un~mployed agents choose search
effort to maximize expected lifetime utility. Agents are risk
14
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averse, so that insuance is desired, and an equilibrium model is
used in order to capture the impact of DI on unemployment.
However, neither author explicitly models firm behavior so that
neither paper is able to captu~e the job destruction effects of DI.
This implies that all of the increase in unemployment from UI is
due to its impact on search effort.
The papers differ in the time horizon that is considered
(Baily uses a two"'period model while Flemming uses an infinite
horizon approach), the manner in which the capital market (and
thus, savings) is handled, and the utility function that is used.
Nevertheless, as we discuss below, they derive remarkably similar
results.
Both authors have the same goal...... to determine the optimal
replacement rate assuming that the rate remains constant over the
spell of unemployment. The results are then compared to
replacement rates offered in the u.s. and the U.K. in order to
determine whether or not current UI programs are too generous.
Briefly, Baily and Flemming both find that if agents cannot save
then the optimal replacement rate lies in the 60%-70% range. This
result is fairly robust, since it does not depend on the time
horizon or the manner in which the authors calibrate their models.
There is one exception ...... this result does depend on the degree of
risk aversion that is assumed. Baily assumes that the Arrow-Pratt
measure of relative risk aversion is constant and equal to one,
while Flemming assumes that the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute
risk aversion is constant and equal to one. For lower measures of
15
CC-16
risk aversion, they find lower optimal replacement rates.
When agents can save but capital markets are imperfect (so
that workers can only partially self-insure), Baily and Flemming
find that the optimal replacement rate falls by about 25-30
percentage points. Thus, they conclude that the optimal
replacement rate is below 50% and that the current u.s.
unemployment insurance program is too generous. Similar
conclusions have been reached by Gruber (1994) who recently used
Baily's framework to estimate the optimal replacement rate for the
u. s ..
In our earlier work, Davidson and Woodbury (1995b), we
criticized Baily and Flemming for two of the assumptions that they
used in their analysis -- both authors assume that all unemployed
agents are eligible for UI benefits and that they. receive such
benefits for as long as they remain unemployed. In reality, less
than 50% of the unemployed are eligible for UI benefits in the u.s.
(Blank and Card 1991) while in the U.K. roughly 70% of the
unemployed are eligible (Layard et al 1991). In addition, benefits
are offered for only 26 weeks in the u.s. and are limited in almost
every other country. In section 4, we review our earlier results
which indicate that the conclusions reached by Bailey and Flemming
are extremely fragile with respect to these two assumptions. We
then go on to extend the Baily and Flemming analysis even further
by explicitly modelling firm behavior and making the wage rate and
the number of active firms endogenous. This allows us to capture
the job destruction effects of ur and see exactly how this alters
16
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our results.
3. Our Model
In this section we provide a description of the model that we
use to derive the optimal UI program. As we describe our model, we
also point out the elements that are missing from each of the
analyses described in section 2. This should help clarify some of
our criticisms of the earlier literature.,
We follow the tradition in this literature by employing a
search model of the labor market. In order to focus on the
benefits and costs of UI we model the behavior of a representative
unemployed worker who is searching for employment and desires
employment insurance. This worker earns a wage of w while employed
and collects UI benefits of x while unemployed provided that she
has not exhausted her benefits. Benefits are provided by the
government to jobless workers who have been unemployed for,no more
than T perIods. Thus, 'at the ,outset we assume that all newly
unemployed workers are eligible for UI. In the next section, we
describe how the model is modified to iake into account the fact
that the actual UI take-up rate is below 100%.
In our model, UI is funded by taxing all employed workers'
incomes at a constant rate 1. This assumption, common in the
optimal UI literature, is used.to capture tne notion that in a
competitive economy the incidence of a UI tax is likely to be borne
by workers~
We assume that unemployed workers choose search, effort (p) to
17
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expected lifetime income and that all workers are
initely lived. As for firms, we assume that each firm hires at
one worker and that new firms enter the labor market until the
profit fromcreating.a'vacancy is zero. Once a firm with
vacancy and an unemployed ~orker meet, they negotiate the wage.
llowing a well~established tradition in the search literature, we
that the negotiated wage splits the surplus created by the
ob evenly (this will be made precise below). T~tal labor demand
(F) and search effort .together determine equilibrium steady-state
unemployment (U)'.
The government's goal is to choose x and T to maximize
aggregate expected lifetime income.' Increases in x and/ or T
provide unemployed workers with additional insurance but these
increases also lower optimal search effort. In addition, since a
more generous UI program reduces the opportunity cost of
unemployment, it increases the wage rate and makes creating a
vacancy .less prdfitable. The reduction in ·search effort coupled
with the destruction of job opportunties leads to an increase in
equilibrium unemployment. The optimal government policy must
balance these costs and benefits.
In terms of the literature reviewed above, our apprqach is
very similar to that of Mortensen (1994) and Millard and Mortensen
(1994) ,except that We assume risk aversion on the part of workers.
Alternatively, o~rwork ~oul~ be viewed as an extension of Baily
(1978) and Flemming (1978) in which we (a) make the potential
duration of benefits variable, (b) take into account the fact that
18
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the DI take-up rate is below 100%, and (c) model labor demand so
that the job destruction effects of DI are taken into account.
We describe the model in three steps. First, we show how to
determine expected lifetime utility for all agents in the economy
and use these measures to define welfare. We also show how these
measures may be used to determine optimal search effort for
unemployed workers. Second, we show how total labor demand and
search effort can be combined to determine equilibrium
unemployment. Finally, we introduce our model of firm behavior and
show how total labor demand and the equilibrium wage are
determined.
Before we begin, a few words about our notation are in order.
Throughout the analysis we define variables such as search effort,
expected lifetime utility, reemployment probabilities, et cetera
that depend upon the employment status of the worker. In- each
case, we use sUb-scripts on the variables to denote the employment
status with w representing employed workers, t denoting unemployed
workers in their t ili period of search, and x denoting unemployed
workers who have exhausted their benefits. Thus, for example, if
we use m to denote the reemployment probability, ~ would represent
the reemployment probability for an unemployed workers in the t ili
period of search while rnx would represent the reemployment
probability for an unemployed worker who has exhausted her
benefits.
A. Expetected Lifetime utility, Search Effort, and Welfar~
19
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We use ~ to denote expected lifetime utility for a worker in
employment state j (j = w if employed, t if unemployed for t
periods, and x if unemployed and benefits have been exhausted). In
addi tion, we use u ( to represent the agents' common utility
function. We assume that per period utility takes the form u(C) -
c(p) with C denoting consumption, c(p) denoting the cost of search,
and p denoting search effort (if unemployed). We assume that c(p)
is a convex function and that c(O) = O. We begin by assuming that
agents cannot save so that in any given period consumption equals
income. In section 4 we discuss how relaxing this assumption
affects our results.
For employed workers,current income consists of two
components -- labor income, which is equal to the wage net of
taxes, w(l - r), and non-labor income, which is equal to their
share of the aggregate prof its earned by the firms, Ow' Thus,
current utility is given by u[w(l - r) + OJ. Obviously, employed
agents incur no search costs. To determine expected lifetime
utility, we must also consider the worker's future prospects. Let
s denote the probability that in any given period the worker will
lose her job. Then, with probability (1 - s) the worker's expected
future lifetime utility will continue to be Vw (since she remains
employed). with the remaining probability of s the worker loses
her job and her expected future lifetime utility falls to VI- It
follows that,
(1) Vw = u[w(l-r)+OwJ + [sVI+(l-s)VwJ/(l+r).
20
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Note that future utili ty is discounted at rate (l+r) wi th r
denoting the interest rate.
Turn next to the unemployed. For them, current income is
equal to the sum of unemployment insurance (if benefits have not
yet been exhausted) and profits. We use Ou to denote a typical
unemployed worker's share of aggregate prof its. Future income
depends on future employment status. We use m to deonte
reemployment probabilities so that with probability ~ the worker
finds a job and can expect to earn Vw in the future, while with the
remaining probability she remains unemployed and can expect to earn
Vt + 1 in the future. Thus,
fort=l, ... ,T.
We are now in a position to define welfare (W). Let Ut
represent the number of workers who have been unemployed for t
periods and define Ux analogously for UI-exhaustees. Then, if we
define J to be the total number of jobs held in the steady-state
equilibrium and aggregate expected lifetime utility across all
agents, we obtain
Finally, since unemployed workers choose search effort (p) to
21
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maximize expected lifetime income (V) we have,
( 5) Pt = arg max V t
( 6) Px = arg max Vx•
for t = 1, ... , T.
In maximizing expected lifetime utility, it is important to note
that the reemployment probability (m) is an increasing function of
search effort (p). We make the link between the two explicit in
SUb-section B below.
This completes the description of expected lifetime utility
and the determination of search effort. At this point it is useful
to note .that if we were to stop here, we would have a model very
similar to the one used by Shavell and Weiss (1979). In essence,
their approach is to describe expected lifetime utility, assume
that m is increasing in p, fix the total amount the government is
going to spend on UI, and then choose a path of benefits (Xl for t
= 1,2, .... ) . to maximize Vi' the expected lifetime utility of a newly
unemployed UI-eligible worker. As discussed above, this does not
take into account the costs of the program nor does it tell us the
optimal amount that the government should be spending on UI. In
addition, it is not at all clear why Shavell and Weiss focus on the
benefit path that maximizes Vlf since it seems clear that W is a
more appropriate measure of welfare.
B. Determining Unemployment
22
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labor market.
To do so, we first show how to determine steady-
Second, we show how the reemployment probabilities
Turn next to the firms. For simplicity, we assume that each
In this sub-section we show how total labor demand (F) and
Formally, we use L to denote total labor supply. Then, since
number of vacancies in a steady-state equilibrium, it follows that
This assumption is commonly used in general equilibrium
search models (see, for example, Diamond 1982 or Pissarides 1990).
Alternatively, we could simply assume" that each firm recruits for
and fills each of its many vacancies separately.
time. Each job is either filled or vacant. If we let V denote the
vary with search effort, labor demand, and other features of the
firm provides only one job opportunity.i Thus, F denotes both the
total number of firms and the total number of jobs available at any
every worker is either employed or unemployed, we have
unemployment as
unemployment.
state unemployment once the reemployment probabilities have been
determined.
In addition, given our definitions of ~ and Ux we can write total
search effort (p) can be combined to determine equilibrium
(7) L = J + U.
CC-24
F = J + V.
We are now in a position to describe the dynamics of the labor
loyment rate and the composition of unemployment both remain
and the conditions that must hold if we are' in a steady-
probability that an employment relationship will dissolve, in
. \for any glvenThen,
Thes'e conditions guarantee that the
In addition, remember that reemployment
We begin by reminding the reader that s isover time.
to be the economy's separation rate -- t~at is, s denotes
equilibrium.
given period.
probabilities are denoted by the m terms.
worker, there are T + 2 possible employment states -- UI , U2 , •••• ,
Ur , Ux ' and J. If employed (i.e., if in 'state J) the worker faces
a probability s of losing her job and moving into state Ut • If
unemployed for t periods (i.e., if in state Ut ), the worker faces
a probability of ~ of finding a job and moving into state J. with
the remaining probability of 1 - ~ this worker remains unemployed
and moves on to state ~+I. Finally, UI-eligible exhaustees face a
reemployment probability of mx' in which case they move into state
J. otherwise, they remain in state Ux.
In a steady-state equilibrium the flows into and out of each
state must be equal so that the unemployment rate and its
composition do not change over time. Using the above notation, the
flows into and out of state U~ are equal if
(10) sJ = UI •
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'.
The flows into and out of state Vt (for t = 2, ... ,T) are equal if
Finally, the flows into and out of state Ux are equal if
In each case, the flow into the state is given on the left-hand-
side of the expression while the flow out of the state is given on
the right-hand-side.
Equations (7)-(12) define the dynamics of the labor market
given the reemployment probabilities and total labor demand. We
must now explain how search effort translates into a reemployment
probability for each unemployed worker., As describeda'bove, 'each
unem~loyed worker chooses search effort (p) to maximize expected
lifetime utility. Seardh effort is best thought of as the numb~r
of firms a worker chooses to contact in each period of job search.
For workers who contact fewer than one firm on average, ~. could
also be thought of as the probability of contacting any firm. Once
a worker contacts a firm, she files an application for employment
if the firm has a vacancy. Since there are F firms and V of them
have vacancies, the probability of contacting ,a firm with a vacancy
is V/F. Finally, once all applications have been filed, each firm
with a vacancy fills it by choosing randomly t:rom its pool of
applicants. Thus, if N other workers apply to the firm" the
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ility of a given worker getting the job is 1/(N+1). since
other worker either does or does not apply, N is a random
with a Poisson distribution with parameter A where A is
the average number of applications filed at each firm. It
straightforward to show that this implies that the probability
getting a job offer conditional on having applied at a firm with
vacancy is (l/A) [1 - eo).,]. The employment probability for any
iven worker is then the product of these three terms -- the number
firms contacted, the probability that a given firm will have a
and the probability of getting the job conditional on
having applied at a firm with a vacancy:
( 13 ) for t = 1, ... ,T
where
These equations define the employment prqbabilities of workers as
a functio~ of search effort and the length of time that they have
been unemployed. Note that for any given worker, the ~earch effort
of other workers affects that worker's employment probability
through A.
Given the levels of search effort and expected lifetime
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utilities defined by ().) .... (E).), equations (7) - (15) can be solved for
equilibrium unemployment (U), its composition (~ for t = 1, ... ,T
and Ux)' and the reemployment probabilities (~for t = 1, ... ,T and
mJ . I f we were to stop developing the model at this point,
treating F and w ,as, exogenous, we would nave a model almost
identical to the on~ .used by Flemming (1978). In fact, there would
be only ·two ,real substantive differences between the models --
Flemming allows .workers tos.avewhile employed while we do not and
Flemming assumes::that U:r: i~. offered·· indefinitely while we assume
that it is oply ~ffered~for ~period~~ As we mentioned above, we
add. a third distinction in the next seotion when we add UI-
ineligible workers, to ,t.he. model ..
c. Firms
To make the ~umber of firm endogenous we assume that firms
enter the market until the expected profit from doing so equals
zero. When a firm enters the market, it creat~s a vacancy and
starts to accept applications from unemployed w.orkers to fill it.
Once the vacancy is filled, the firm produces and sell~ output as
long as its vacanc:,y.remains fj..lled .. If the f.irm loses its worker,
it must re$ta~tt~e proces~ of fi~ling its vacancy.
We use· IIy to.genote the expected .lifetime profit for a firm
that currently has a vacancy and use IT] to represent the expected
lifetime profit for a firm that has filled its vacancy. Thus, when
a firm enters the market and creates a vacancy it can expect ~o
earn ITv in the future. Once it fills its vacancy, its expectations
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future profits rise to~. Firms enter until
( 16) IIv = O.
To calculate ITv and ~ we folow the same procedure that was
used to determine expected lifetime utilities -- we consider the
current and future prospects of typical firms. Let q denote the
probability of filling a vacancy, use R to denote the revenue
earned by a firm that is producing, and let K represent the cost of
maintaining a vacancy. Then, current profit for a firm with a
vacancy is -K while current profit for a firm that is producing is
R - w - K. Now consider their future prospects. A firm that has
an opening fills it with probability q, 'in which case its expected
lifetime profits rise to~. with the remaining probability the
vacancy remains open and the firm contin~es to' expect to ~arn IIv •
Thus,
( 17) IIy = - K + [qII] + (l-q) ITv ] / (1+r) •
A firm that has already hired a worker keeps that worker with
probability (l-s) and continues to 'earn np with the remaining
probability, it loses its worker and sees its expected profits fall
to IIv • Thus,
( 18) IT] = R - w - K + [snv +( 1-s )IT,] / (1+r) •
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Note that, as before, future profits are discounted at rate (l+r).
The probability of filling a vacancy, q, depends on the number
of firms competing for the unemployed (V), the number of une~ployed
workers (U) and the search effo~t of workers. In any given period
the number of unemployed workers who find new jobs is equal to
I:tIl\Ut + mxUx while the number of vacancies that are filled is equal
to qv. Since these values must be equal, we have
Note that the search effort of workers enters (19) through the
reemployment probabilities.
The next step in developing our model is to use ilv and ~ to
determine the profits that are distributed to workers in each
period in the form of dividends (Ow for the employed and Ou for the
unemployed) . Since there are J jobs filled in equilibrium with
each one generating IIJ in expected lifetime profits, aggregate
expected lifetime profits are JilJ. Thus, the aggregate per period
profits are equal to rJ~/ (l+r). These profits must be distributed
to workers each period. We assume that these profits are
distributed evenly to employed workers with the unemployed
receiving nothing. It follows that Ow = rJilJ/(l+r)J = rIIJ/(l+r) and
Ou = o. We make this assumption for the following reason. Suppose
that the government were to reduce the generousity of the DI
program, resulting in an increase in aggragte profits.. If the
unemployed were to receive a share of 'these profits, this increase
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non-labor income could swamp the decrease in UI leaving the
loyed better-off. Since it is unlikely that the unemployed
ive significant income from such non-labor sources, we assume
all profits go to the employed.
The final step in developing our model is to explain how the
is determined. Following the general equilibrium search
(see, for example, Diamond 1982 or Pissarides 1990), we
that the firms and workers split the surplus created by the
ive job evenly. For firms, when they fill a vacancy
expected profits rise from ITv to IT]" For an average worker,
they become employed their expected lifetime utility rises
Vu to Vw where Vu deontes the average expected lifetime utility
unemployed workers. That is,
It follows that the tota.l surplus created by the average job when
measured in dollars is ilJ - ilv + (Vw - Vu) MU) where MU1 represents the
workers marginal utility of income and allows us to transform the
workers gain, Vw - Vu ' which is measured in utility, into an
appropriate dollar value. This surplus is split evenly between the
firm and its employee if the wage solves
In summary, when we model firms the number of firms demanding
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labor (F) is determined by (16) while the equilibrium wage is
determined by (21).'
The government's problem is to choose x (the UI benefit level)
and T (the potential duration of benefits) to maximize welfare (W,
as given in eq. 4') $ubject to the constraint that its budget
balances. Since there are J employed workers each earning a wage
,of w, total tax revenue is equal to JWf. In equilibrium, U - Ux
unemployed workers each receive benefits of x each period. Thus,
the total cost of the program is (U - Ux) x. For the budget to
balance it must be the case that
(22) (U - Ux) x = JWf.
As noted above an increase in x or T increases the level of
insurance provided to unemployed workers, but both increase
equilibrium unemployment and require that f increase in order to
fund the expanded program.
This completes the description of our model. In structure it
is very ,similar to that of Mortensen (1994) and Millard and
Mortensen (1994). The major difference is in the manner in which
welfare is measured -- while they use aggregate income net of
search, recruiting, and training costs as their measure of welfare
we use aggregate expected lifetime utility. These two measures are
identical if ag,ents are risk neutral. However, if the utility
function is concave, so that agents are risk ave~se, the measures
differ. As we argued above, we feel that it is important to assume
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D. Properties of Equilibrium
Before we turn to optimal policy, it is useful to first
describe the structure of equ~librium ~nd some of its comparative
dynamic properties. It is. straight:forward, to show that in a
steady-state equilibrium that Vw > VI > ~2 >. ',.? VT, > Vx • That is,
expected lifetime income is hi~he~t for ~mployed workers, lowest
for unemployed workers who haveexhausi7ed tl1e,irbeI1ef its, and
decreasing in the number of weeks that a worker has been
unemployed. Intuitively, workers in the early stages of a spell of
unemployment have more weeks to find a j()~ before they have to
worry about losing their VI ,benefits,.:.Because of<.this, workers who
have recently become unemployed w~ll not search ~s ~ard as those
who have been unemployed for a longer period of ti~e -- that is,
optimal search effort will be increasing in the number of weeks of
unsuccessful search, (PI < P2 ~~ •• < PT'< pJ:.
A decrease in VI benefits, Cx), or th~.potential duration of
benefits (T) decreases the, level o~,insuranceoffe~ed unemployed
workers and triggers an increase,~ in search ef~~rt by all UI-
eligible workers (and therefore lowers equili~r~um unemployment) .
Either change results in a decrease in ~for all t~ but decreases
in x and T have opposit~ effects on th~~robabilityof eXhausting
benefits. A decrease in x makes it l~ss likely ,that a worker will
exhaust her VI benef its be.fore, finding "a jpb (since ,. she searches
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harder). But a ~ecrease in T makes it more likely that benefits
will be exhausted since the time horizon over which benefits are
offered has been shortened (this is true in spite of the fact that
search effort increases as a 'result of the decrease in T). Of
course, increases in x or T lead to the opposite effects.
Changes in the' DI program also have important implications for
firm behavior and labor demand. Since increases in either x or T
reduce the cost of being unemployed, they make workers le~s willing
to search for and/or accept jobs. This results in an increase in
Vu and forces firms to increase the wage that they offer their new
employees. This increase in the wage makes production less
profitable and results in fewer firms and fewer job opportunities.
This job destruction effect increases unemployment and lowers net
output.
E. Calibration
In order to determine the optimal DI program we must choose
values for the parameters of the model, solve for the equilibrium
generated by each pair of policy parameters (x and T), and compare
the ~evels of welfare achieved in the different equilibria.
Assuming that we choose realistic values for the parameters, this
exercise should give us some idea as to the ranges in which the
optimal level of benefits and the optimal potential duration of
benefits lie.
The parameters of the model are the separation rate (s), the
interest rate (r), the size of the labor force (L), the search cost
33
CC-34
function (c(p)), the revenue earned by producing firms (R), the
cost of maintaining a vacancy (K), and the utility function, u(C).
since we are interested in varying the degree of risk aversion, we
calibrate the model separately for a variety of different utility
functions and compare the optimal programs that result.
We calibrate the ,model in two steps. First, we treat the
model introduced in sub-sections A and B as· if it were self-
contained -- that is, we treat the number of firms (F) and the wage
(w) as if they were parameters of t~e model. To calibrate this
portion of the model we rely on data collected to analyze the
Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiment. Since we have discussed
this calibration exercise in detail elsewhere (see, for example,
Davidson and Woodbury 1993, 1994), we provide only a brief
description of how we obtain estimates of the para~eters of this
abbreviated model. Briefly, this portion of the model is
calibrated so that it~ predictions concerning the impact of a
reemployment bonus offered to unemployed workers matches what was
observed in Illinois. By treating F and w as fixed, we are
implicitly assuming that the Illinois experiment had no wage or job
creation/job destruction effects. In fact, the data does indicate
that there were no wage effects from the reemployment bonus
(Woodbury and Speigelman 1987) and, given that the program was
temporary and limited in scope, it seems reasonable to assume that
there were no significant changes in the number of firms seeking
workers as a result of the bonus. Thus, we consider this approach
appropriate.
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In the second step, we expand the model (by adding sub-section
C) so that F and w become endogenous. This adds two new parameters
to the model -- R (the revenue earned by the firm when producing)
and K (the cost of maintaining a vacancy). These values are then
chosen so that the full model yields (a) a value for w that matches
the data collected in Illinois, and (b) values for F that lie in
the range predicted by the abbreviated model in the first stage of
calibration.
Now, we begin with step one of the calibration. When
considering the abbreviated model (as introduced in sub-sections A
and B), the parameters of interest are the separation rate (s), the
interest rate (r), the wage (w), the number of firms (F), the size
of the labor force (L), and the search cost function (c(p)). We
can obtain an estimate for s from the-existing literature on labor
market dynamics. Ehrenberg (1980) and Murphy and Topel (1987) both
provide estimates of the number of jobs that break-up ,in each
period. If we measure time in 2-week intervals, their work
suggests that s lies in the range of .007 to .013. For the
interest rate we set r = .008 which translates into an annual
discount rate of approximately 20%. Since our previous work
(Davidson and Woodbury 1993) suggests that results from this model
are not sensitive to changes in r over a fairly wide range, this is
the only value for the interest rate that we consider.
For F and L we begin by noting that our model is homogeneous
of degree zero in F and L so that we may set L = 100 wi~hout loss
of generality. If we then vary F holding all other parameters
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ixed we can solve for the equilibrium unemployment and vacancy
Abraham's (1983) work suggests that the ratio of
loyment to vacancies (U/V) varies between 1.5 and 3 over the
iness cycle. Although the actual values of U and V depend on
the other parameters, we find that to obtain such values for U/V in
our model with L = 100, F must lie in range of 95 to 97.5. Thus,
in the second stage of the calibration, we must choose values for
Rand K such that F lies in the range 95-97.5.
The remaining parameters in sub-sections A and B are the wage
rate and the search cost function. For these values we turn to the
data and results from the Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiment.
In the Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiment a rondomly selected
group of new claimants for UI were offered a $500 bonus for
accpeting a new job within 11 weeks of filing their initial claim.
The average duration of unemployment for these bonus-offered
workers was approximately .7 weeks less than the average
unemployment duration of the randomly selected control group
(Davidson and Woodbury 1991). In our previous work, we estimated
the parameters of the search cost function that would be consistent
with such behavioral results. That is, we assumed a specific
functional form for c(p) anQ then solved for the parameters that
would make the model's predictions match the outcome observed in
the Illinois experiment. The functional form that we used was c(p)
= cpz, where z denotes the elasticity of search costs with respect
to search effort. The values for c and z that make the model's
predictions exactly match what occured in Illinois depends upon the
36
CC-37
utility function that is assumed. For example, if we assume that
the utility function is linear in consumption, then our results
indicated that for the average bi-weekly wage rate ob~erved in
Illinois ($511), the values of c and z that are consistent with the
Illinois experimental results are c = 338 and z = 1.23. On the
other hand, if the utility function takes on the form u(C) = In(C) ,
we find that the values of c and z that are consistent with the
Illinois experimental results are c = 2.05 and z = 1.38.
Finally, turn to the second stage of calibration. In order to
make F and w endogenous, we add the equations in sub-section C to
the model. This adds only two new parameters, Rand K. From the
Illinois data we know that the average bi-weekly wage should be
$511, and, from stage one of the calibration we know that F must
lie in the range 95 to 97.5. Thus, we set x and T equal to their
Illinois values -- x, the average bi-weekly UI benefit in Illinois
is set equal to $242, and T, the potential duration of UI, in
Illinois is set equal to 14 (since each period equals 2 weeks)
and then we solve the model to determine what values of Rand K
would lead 'the model to predict that w = $511 and that F would fall
in the range 95-97.5. Of course, the values of Rand K depend upon
the assumed functional form for the" utility function. If the
utility function is linear in consumption, then when R·= 724 and K
= 2417 the model predicts that w = 511 and F = 96.25. On the. other
hand, if u(C) = In(c), then when R = 1469 and K = 10863 the model
predicts that w = $511 and F = 96.25.
Once the calibration is complete, we set the parameters at the
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librated levels and solve for the welfare maximizing values of x
T. Once we have solved for the optimal values for x and T in
case, we vary the parameters over the ranges described above to
for the sensitivity of our results with respect to each
4. Results
rn this section we begin by revi~wing results from our earlier
Davidson and Woodbury (1995), in which we solved for the
imal Dr program in the abbreviated model outlined in sections
A and 3.B. These results are best thought of extensions of Baily
978) and Flemming's (1978) work to an environment in which (a)
potential duration of benefits can vary and be controlled by
government, and (b) not all unemployed workers are eligible for
Next, we present new results concerning optimal ur when firm
is explicitly added to the model as in section 3.e. This
lows us to examine how our initial results must be modified when
job destruction effects of more generous ur programs are taken
account. Finally, we extend our model once more in order to
low for worker heterogeniety and show how including workers with
fferent labor market experiences in the model alters our results.
optimal Potential Duration of Benefits without ~ob .Destruction
The most surprising result from our earlier analysis is that
the abbreviated model the optimal p?tential duration of benefits
infinite -- that is, the government should offer ur benefits
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indefinitely to all unemployed UI eligible workers. Although there
are some details omitted from the following reasoning2 , the crux of
the argument is as follows. Agents facing employment risk would
prefer a program that allows them to smooth consumption as much as
possible across spells of unemployment. Thus, if given the choice
between two DI programs that provide the same level of total
benefits to the unemployed, agents would choose the program that
does the best job of consumption smoothing. with this in mind,
consider the following two UI programs -- the first program offers
a benefit level of x for T periods while the second program offers
a benefit level of x' for T+l periods where X' < x and is chosen so
that the two programs provide the same level of total benefits to
the unemployed. Thus, the first program offers higher benefits but
for a shorter period of time. The key to the argument is to note
that the second program allows for greater consumption smoothing --
in moving from the first program to the second program benefits are
lowered during the least adverse states of unemployment (i.e., the
initial phase) and increased in one of the most adverse states
(period T+l in which no benefits are offered in the first program)
with total benefits provided remaining the same. In other words,
by accepting slightly decreased benefits (and consumption) during
the first T periods of unemployment, the unemployed can insure that
benefits will not completely disappear for an additional period.
Thus, all unemployed workers prefer the second program. Since this
reasoning holds for all finite T, it follows that in an optimal DI
2 See Davidson and Woodbury (1995b) for details.
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program T must equal infinity.
This result has important implications for some of the work
reviewed in section 2. Most importantly, this result implies that
the conclusions reached by Ba,i.ly and Flemming are misleading.
since both authors use models in which it is assumed that benefits
are offered indefinitely and since, in their models it is indeed
optimal to provide benefits indefinitely, the optimal replacement
rates that they derive are correct -- without savings, the optimal
replacement rate is in the 60-70% range, and, with savings but
imperfect capital markets, the optimal replacement rate is in the
40-50% range3 • However, these rates are optimal only if they are
offered indefinitely. Thus, the conclusion that Baily and Flemming
reach, that the U.S.'s 50% replacement rate is probably too high,
is misguided, since the u.s. offers this ·rate for only 26 weeks.
In fact, if we solve for the optimal replacement rate with T set
exogenously at 26 weeks, we find that the optimal replacement rate
is I! It follows that if one ignores the job destruction effect of
UI, the current u.s. unemployment insurance program is not generous
enough.
It is important, however, not to place too much emphasis on
this result. That is, we must remember the setting in which it was
derived it was derived in a model in which the job destruction
effects of DI were ignored. In fact, as we show below, when the
job destruction effects are taken into account, this result no
3 It is important to note that our abbreviated model yields
almost identical predictions concerning optimal replacement rates.
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longer holds. For this reason" we do not believ~ that an optimal
ur program would indeed becharacteri~edbyan ~nLimited potential
duration of benefits. However" what thisr,esul t does indicate is
that an optimal ur program is I\iore likely to be characterized by
low benef its and a long potential' ;duration ot benef its than a
program with high benefits and a short potential duration of
benefits (as in the U.S.). The intuition behind this result is
clear -- programs with long potential durations of bene£its lead to
smoother consumption paths and therefore reduce the,risk associated
with unemployment more than pro,grams with shorter potential
duratio,ns.
B. Optimal Replacement Rates with UI-Inelig~bles in the Model
Our second extension of the Baily and Flemming analyses was to
explicitly take into, account the, fact that not all unemployed
workers are eligible to collect UI. ",For example, for the U. s.
Blank and Card (1991) report that over r 50% of,the unemployed are
ineligible for ur and that ot those who are eligible, only 75%
bother to file for their benefits. Laya~d et"~l (1991) report that
in the D.K. up to 30% of the unemployed ~re not eligible to collect
ur benefits. This fact has important i,mplications for the optimal
replacement rate since more generous DI h,s~ositive spill-over
effects on DI-ineligibles. The reasoning is as follows. If the
government institutes a more generous UI program, Dr-eligibles
respond by searching less hard for employment. Assumin~ that DI-
eligible and Ur-ineligibles compete for some of the same jobs, this
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Optimal search effort for uI-ineligibles is then the value of PI
that maximizes Vi:
arg max Vi.
The remaining equations of the model can be modified in a similar
fashion (interested readers are referred to Davidson and Woodbury
1995b for details) with only one new parameter added the
proportion of the unemployed who are ineligible for UI. Following
Blank and Card (1991) we set this value equal to .6 for our
basecase, and then vary it throughout the analysis from 0 to .6 to
see how sensitive our results are to the value of the parameter.
We find, as expected, that including UI-ineligibles in the
model does increase the optimal replacement rate. Depending upon
the values of the other parameters (the interest rate, the
separation rate, et cetera), we find that the positive spill-over
effects of UI on UI-ineligibles increases the optimal replacement
rate by 6 to 10 percentage points. Thus, if agents cannot save and
the job destruction effects of UI are ignored, an optimal UI
program offers a replacement rate in the 65-75% range indefinitely.
If, on the other hand, agents can save but the job destruction
effects of UI are ignored, then an optimal UI program ·entails the
government offering replacement rates in the 45-55% ,range
indefinitely.
This completes the description of our earlier results. Before
moving on and discussing our new results, it is important to note
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all of our previous results were derived assuming that utility
s linear in consumption. If we had also assumed that search costs
linear in effort, this would have been equivalent to assuming
isk neutrality and there would have been no demand for employment
However, since we assumed that search costs were convex
in effort, each individual's optimization problem is concave in the
choice variable and thus, each agent is risk averse.
To see how increasing the degree of risk aversion affects
these results, we have recently recalibrated the model for two
different utility functions, namely u[C] = In(C) and u[C] =VC, and
rederived the optimal replacement rate in each case. The log
utility function is characterized by constant Arrow-Pratt relative
risk aversion equal to one and was chosen since it is identical to
the one used by Baily (1978). The square root utility function is
characterized by constant Arrow-Pratt relative risk aversion equal
to 1/2 and was used since its measure of risk aversion falls mid-
way between our other two extremes (the linear and log utility
functions). Surprisingly, in this model without job destruction,
we find that the degree of risk aversion does not make much
difference -- optimal replacement rates rise by only about 5% when
we go from the linear to the log utility function and only about 2%
when we go from the linear to the square root utility function.
The reason for this is that in recalibrating the model with the new
utility functions, the values of the parameters change so that the
model once agian yields predictions that are consistent with the
Illnois data. For example, as we make the agents in the model more
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risk averse, the degree of convexity of the search cost function
must also increase so that the model still yields the same
predictions concerning a reemployment bonus. Since we recalibrate
the model for each utility function so that the reemployment bonus
impact is identical across the models, it is not surprising that
the models yield similar predictions concerning UI. 4
In summary, our earlier work focused on two shortcomings of
the Baily and Flemming approaches -- the fact that th~y simply
assumed that UI benefits would be offered indefinitely and the fact
that they assumed that all agents are eligible for UI. We
demonstarted that both of these assumptions bias their results in
favor of less generous UI programs and led them to draw misleading
conclusions. However, as we have emphasized above, these are not
the only two shortcomings of the Baily and Flemming analyses --
they also ignored the impact of UI on firm behavior. In the next
sub-section we discuss how extending the model to allow for the job
destruction effects of UI forces us to further modify our
conclusions concerning an optimal UI program.
c. Job Destruction and Risk Aversion
When firm behavior is endogenized, there are several
additional effects of UI. First, if a more generous UI program is
4 When we cal'ibrate the model for the square root utility
function we obtain the following values for the key parameters --
c = , z = , R = , K =
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fered, the average expected lifetime income for the unemployed
) rises and this triggers an increase in the equilibrium wage.
is higher wage lowers profit for producing firms (ITJ ) and lowers
expected lifetime profit for a firm creating a vacancy (ITy ).
is results in fewer firms (F) and fewer job opportunities. In
of welfare, per period income for the employed could rise or
11 (since the wage is increasing while non';'labor income from
irms is falling) while unemployment unambiguously rises due to the
ob destruction effect. Thus, in a model with endogenous labor
the optimal Dr program is likely to be less generous than
optimal DI program in a model in which firm behavior is
, and the size of the job destruction effect determines just
much less generous it will be.
Our results indicate that, regardless of the degree of risk
ion, the job destruction effect is large enough to overturn
result that it is optimal to offer Dr benefits indefinitely.
see why, return to our earler argument concerning the potential
duration of benefits. We argued that for any Dlprogram in which
T were f inite there would exist another Dr progra'm with longer
potential duration of benefits and lower benefits that would cost
the same to finance and would be strictly prefered by all
unemployed agents. Thus, it would always be possible to increase
T and raise welfare. This argument no longer holds when labor
demand is endogenous since increasing T in this manner reduces the
number o·f job opportunities and increases unemployment. This
negative effect of the decrease in job opportunities must be
46
CC-47
weighed against the positive impact of smoothing consumption to
determine if the increase in T raises welfare. We find that for
all levels of risk aversion, the job destruction effect of
increasing T eventually outweigns the consumption smoothing eff~ct
of increasing T so that benefits should eventually be cut-off.
The point at which the government should stop providing
benefits depends heavily on the degree of risk aversion. We
consider three cases. In the first, we assume that utility is
linear in consumption so that the degree of risk aversion is
extremely low (the reader is reminded that in this case risk
aversion enters through the convexity of the search cost function) .
This makes our model and approach very similar to that of Mortensen
(1994) and Millard and Mortensen (1994). In fact, in this case,
our model yields predictions that are almost identical to those in
Mortensen (1994) -- we find that the current ur program in the u.s.
generates a dead weight loss of roughly 1.2% of welfare.
The fact that we obtain results that are so similar to
Mortensen (1994) in spite of the fact that our models are
calibrated in very different manners using different data is
comforting. In addition, the reader is reminded that the
abbreviated model of sub-sections 3.A-3.B yielded results
remarkably similar to those found in Baily (1978) and Flemming
(1978). Thus, our model seems to be able to reproduce the existing
results in the literature once the assumptions are altered to match
the models used by previous authors. This is true in spite of the
fact that virtually all of the previous models were calibrated in
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ferent ways using data from a wide variety of different sources.
Unlike Mortensen (1994), we go on to use our model to derive
optimal UI program when benefits are constant over the spell of
loyment. With this low level of risk aversion, we find that
optimal UI program entails no benefits at all! That is, when
degree of risk aversion is low,thejobdestruction effect of
is large enough to out weigh the positive impact of even one
of insurance. Clearly, this result depends upon the fact that
utility is linear in consumption the demand for employment
is relatively low.
In the second case that we consider we assume that U(C) =
(C) so that the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is
and equal to one. This is the utility function used by
ily (1978) and is probably the utility function that is most
used in the literature on ~ecision making ~nder uncertai~ty.
these preferences, we obtain very different results. First,
stark contrast to the results obtained with linear utility, we
find that the current U.S. unemployment insurance system increases
welfare above the level that would be achieved without pUblically
provided UI. Moreover, the welfare gains are far from trivial
our estimate is that welfare rises by 1.2%.
Our second set of results concern the optimal UI program. As
before, the job destruction effect overturns the result that
benefits should be offered indefinitely. However, in this case,
the optimal value of T remains quite large -- 90 weeks -- so that
benefits should be offered for almost two full years. Thus, the
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job destruction effect is not nearly as important when agents are
reasonably risk averse. As for the optimal replacement rate, when
agents cannot self-insure, the optimal replacement rate is 65%.
With savings, this rate is lik'ely to fall by roughly 20%. We
conclude that with reasonable assumptions~oncerningrisk aversion,
the optimal UI program offers benefits slightly below 50% for
almost two years. Our model predicts that instituting such a UI
program would raise welfare above the level achieved with the
current U. s. program by 5.5% of welfare -- a startlingly high
measure for a potential welfare gain.
In the final case that we consider we assume that utility is
equal to the square root of consumption~ This utility function has
a constant Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion equal to
1/2, so that it falls mid-way between our other two utility
functions. With this utility function we find that the 'current UI
program in the US is just about ri,ght _.- ,the .optimal program
involves offering a replacement rate of ~1% for 26 weeks. We also
find that this optimal program increases welfare abo~e the levels
that would be achieved without a UI program by about 2%.
The differences in our three sets of results indicate that the
assumptions made concerning risk aversion 'are crucial. Thus, it
is important to determine which utility function, represents the
most reasonable assumption concerning risk avet"sion. To answer
this question, there are two contradictory strands of literature
that we m'ay consult. Firsti there is the empirical literature on
consumption behavior that attempts to directly estimate agents'
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degree of risk aversion (see, for example, Zeldes 1989). The work
this area se~ms'to indicate that the best point estimate of the
Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk 'aversion is 2.
The other literature', which is theoretical, attepmts to infer
the degree of risk aversion from observed behavior. For example,
we can observe how agents adjust their investment portfolios as
their wealth changes and we cart build models of investment under
uncertainty to explain suc~behavior. Most work in this area finds
th~t the theories "of ch6ice under un~ertainty are consistent with
observed behavior only if the A~row-Pratt measur~ of relative risk
aversion is less than one.'
The fact that these two literatures contradict one another is
trOUbling and leaVes us in an uncomfortable position. Our work
indicates that if the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion
is close to (or above) one,'then the current D1 program in the US
in not nearly ,generous enough.. H.owever., if the Arrow-Pratt measure
of relative riska~ersioh is 2loseto 1}2, then the current system
is about right. If one choose~ to believ~ the empirical literature
on consumption" (as we tend to do), then the former outcome is much
more likely than ther~tter~ Thu_, w~conclude that in the most
general model with the most reasonable assumption concerning riSk
aVersion, we find ~hat the6pfimal ui program offers benefits that
are close to, the', levels curren'bly offered by most. S~ates in the
u. S .. but it ,offers those 'benefits 'for a con,siderably longer period
of time -- almost two years. In ot,her word's, the current u. S.
program does no:toffer sufficient employment insurance.
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c. Heterogeniety
All of the previous work on UI, including our own, relies on
the assumption that all agents are alike. In reality, however,
workers are subject to a wide variety of labor market experiences.
Some workers are never unemployed, others find jobs quickly, and
some always face long spells of unemployment upon losing a job. In
addition, some agents may attempt to take advantage of the DI
system ~hile others would never even consider filing fo~ benefits
much less exploit the system. This implies that agents will have
different preferences concerning employment insurance based on
their labor market histories and expectations. Moreover, the
number of workers that attempt to exploit the system may depend
upon the generousity of the program.
In order to take worker heterogeniety into account, we extend
our model to allow for three different classes of workers. The
first class represents the bulk of the labor force and is described
by the model introduced above. These workers face' employment risk,
losing their jobs with probability s in each period, and actively
search for a new job once unemployed.
The second class consists of workers who are never unemployed.
We refer to this group as "professionals" and use ¢ to denote the
proportion of the labor force that falls into this class. We also
use Lp to denote the number of such workers and Vp to denote their
expected lifetime utility. Since these workers are never
unemployed, they earn w in each period of life, and thus, Vp =
u(w) (l+r)/r. The total contribution of these workers to social
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welfare is therefore LpVp and adding professionals to the model is
accomplished by adding this term to W as defined in equation (4).
The last class of workers consists of agents who try to take
advantage of the system. We refer to such workers as "slouchers."
We assume that these agents work only to become eligible for DI and
that they live off of the dole as much as possible. We use Lg to
denote the number of slouchers and use Vg to represent their
expected lifetime utility. Thus, their contribution to social
welfare (W) is equal to LgVg•
Presumably, the number of slouchers in the labor force will be
a function of the generousity of the system -- a more generous DI
program should result in more slouchers. To measure the
generousity of the system, we introduce the following variable G:
G = {u(x)/u(w)}{l - (l/l+r)T+l}.
G measures the ratio of utility recieved by simply collecting
benefits as opposed to working for wage w during one spell of
unemployment that lasts T periods (the potential duration of
benefits). 'Note that if x = 0 or T = 0, so that no DI is offered,
G = o. On the other hand, as the replacement rate approaches one
and T approaches infinity, G approaches 1. Increases in G
represent increases in the generousity of the UI program. We
assume that a, the proportion of the labor force that are
slouchers, is positively related to G. In particular, we assume
that a = 7]G.
To complete the extended model, we must describe the
determination of 7] and Vg • Consider Vs first. We assume that,
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since these agents work as little as possible, they contribute less
to social welfare than the average unemployed agent (who, after
all, is at least seeking a job). Thus, since Vu is the average
expected lifetime utility for unemployed workers, we set Vs = OVu
with 0 < 1. We then vary 0 and see how this affects the optimal UI
program.
For '7, we solve the model under the assumption that the
current US program is in effect (a 50% replacement ~ate offered for
26 weeks) and then vary '7 so that a ranges from 0 to .05. Thus, we
consider values for '7 that imply that currently anywhere from 0% to
5% of the labor force is exploiting the system.
Our results for the square-root utility function are
summarized in Tables 1 and 2 where we report the optimal UI program
for various values of a, 0, and ¢. In each cell, the optimal ui
program is reported by first listing the optimal replacement rate
and then listing the optimal potential duration of benefits. Table
1 shows how the optimal UI program varies with a and 0 when there
are no professionals in the model (i.e., ¢ = 0). If a = 0, so that
there are no slouchers in the model, the optimal program offers a
61% replacement rate for 26 weeks. As the number of slouchers
increases, the generousity of the optimal program declines
regardless of the value of n. This is hardly surprising -- with
more slouchers in the economy the government needs to make the
program less generous in order to discourage the expoitation of the
system.
Table 1 also indicates that th~ generousity of the optimal
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program is decreasing in 0, the parameter that measires the amount
that slouchers contribute to social welfare. As n decreases,
slouchers contribute less to social welfare and it becomes more
important for the government to discourage slouching. Table 1
clearly indicates the importance of the actual values of a and n.
If a is low or if 0 is close to one, then the optimal program is
qui te close to the optimal program in the model that ignores
slouching. On the other hand, for large values of.a and low values
of n (e.g., a = .05 and n = .7), the 'optimal program is
considerasbly less generous.
Table 2 report the optimal UI program when both slouchers and
professionals are included in the model. These results are derived
assuming that utility is eqaul to the square-root of consumption
and that n = .8 (as in the middle row of' Table 1). table 2
indicates that as the number of professionals increases the optimal
program becomes more generous. The reasoning is as follows.
Adding professionals to the model spreads out the tax burden that
the VI system places on the employed and allows the government to
afford a more generous system. As in Table 1, knowing the true
value of ¢ is important -- for low values of a, the optimal DI
program varies quite a bit with ¢. For example, when a =. 0 the
optimal DI program when 10% of the work force is made up of
professionals offers a replacement rate of 64% for 28 weeks. If,
on the other hand, 30% of the work force are professionals, the
optimal program offers a replacement rate slightly higher (68%) but
for a much longer time (36 weeks).
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5. Discussion
In this paper we have presented a general equilibrium search
model of the labor market in order to determine the optimal DI
program when (a) the government can control the optimal potential
duration of benefits and (b) the replacement rate must remain
constant over the spell of unemployment until benefits are
exhausted. We believe that our approach is superior to those that
have been used in the past for a number of reasons. First, with
respect to the labor economics literature, we have used an
equilibrium model that allows us to measure the costs of different
DI programs through their impact on search effort, job creation and
unemployment. with respect to the macroeconomics literature, we
have assumed that workers are risk averse so that we can measure
the welfare benefits of different DI programs through the insurance
that they provide against employment risk. Finally, with respect
to the literature in pUblic economics, we have adopted their
approach, but offered a richer model in that (a) we have allowed
the potential duration of benefits to vary, (b) we have included
DI-ineligibles in the model, and (c) we have modeled firm behavior
so that we could measure the job destruction effects of DI.
Our basic finding is that current benefit levels offered by
most states in the u.s. are about right, but that these benefits
are not offered for a long enough period of time. Thus, we
conclude that the current U.s. system in not generous enough.
Our finding that the optimal UI program is ~haracterized by
fairly a low replacement rate and a very long potential duratton of
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stands in stark contrast to most of the previous
However, we argue below that our results should have
~~~~~~~, since they are consistent with the vast abstract
on optimal insurance contracts in the presence of moral
In the next sub-section we offer a brief review of this
i terature for two purposes. First, reviewing this literature
llows us to view the UI issue from a different perspective -- one
makes the economic sense behind our results -seem almost
Second, the results in this literature suggest that
may be another slightly more complex UI program that is
ically different from the current program and possibly superior
the one that we have proposed.
The Optimal Insurance Literature
There are three issues that have been addressed in the
abstract literature on optimal insurance contracts that have
important implications for the design of an optimal UI program.
The first issue concerns the design of an optimal insurance
contract when the insured- agent's behavior can effect the
probability of a loss occuring (i.e., moral hazard is present). To
investigate this issue, it is assumed that the agent's behavior
cannot be observed by the insurance provider so that the contract
must be structured in a manner that makes putting forth effort
optimal for the agent. The key issue then is how to provide
adequate insurance without reducing the agent's incentive to aviod
the loss. Shavell (1979) is perhaps the best known work in this
56
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area.
When agents face uncertainty inThe reasoning is as follows.
unobservable to the insurance providers. The main issue in this
case is to devise insurance contracts that will lead agents to
and stiglitz (1976).
self-select into groups and therefore reveal their personal
characteristics. The classic article in this area is Rothschild
The second issue concerns the optimal way to share risk
between a risk neutral insurance provider and a risk averse agent
when the total level of insurance coverage is fixed. Although the
article actually addresses a host of other issues as well, Raviv
(1979) provides the classic treatment of this issue.
The final issue concerns the design of insuarnce contracts in
the presence of adverse selection -- a situation in which agents
differ in a dimension that affects their need for insurance but is
The remarkable thing about these three strands of literatyre
is that in spite of the fact that they ask different questions,
they all come up with the same answer -- in all 'three cases, the
optimal insurance contract takes the form of a "deductible policy"
in which coverage is not provided for losses below a certain level.
income they would like to smooth income as much as possible by
purchasing insurance. In fact, in the absence of moral hazard
'boncerns, 'theoptima~ insurance ~ontract ~n a competitive insurance
market provides full coverage so that' income is the, same in all
circumstances. However, when moral hazard is present, the market
breaks down when full insurance is provided since, in that case, no
would have any incentive to take care in order to avoid large
ses. wi th no one taking care, large losses would occur and
providers would go broke compensating the insured. Thus,
that full insurance will 'not be provided, what type of
is best? To answer this, note that agents are most
about avoiding catastrophes -- that is, extremely large
It follows that the outcomes that they are most concerned
being insured against are the most adverse outcomes, and any
imal insurance contract will have to provide coverage in such
The insurance contract must also provide incentives to take
to avoid losses, and this is provided by not covering small
ses -- there is a deductible that the insured agent must cover
time that a loss occurs. In summary, a deductible contract
agents to cover all small losses and provides coverage
inst large losses. It is optimal since it provides coverage in
cases that agents are most concerned about and includes
ives for agents to put forth effort to avoid losses.
What are the implications for unemployment insurance? For
unemployed workers, large losses occur when they suffer long spells
of unemployment. Thus, an optimal UI program should provide
compensation to those who have a particularly diificult time
finding reemployment. This is why we find that a long potential
duration of benefits is optimal. As for the deductible, we have
ruled them out by requiring the replacement rate to remain constant
over the spell of unemployment until benefits are exhausted.
Therefore, the only way to force agents to search for employment is
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One simple way to do so wOUld be to use a three stage program in
For example, the
most needed.
This' type o't' program would aiso carry with it at least two
. " ..
quickly, the government would step in and provide help when it is
be receiving very little from the government early on. However, in
the unfortunate ~~s~sin~h{6hworkersare una~le to find new jobs
replacement tate ~ould be 25% for the first 26 weeks of
unemployment, followed by 60% for weeks 27 through 90, followed by
zero thereafter. Such' ~ ptogr~m would provide a strong incentive
for unemployed wofkers to fi~d' rapid reemployment since they would
followed by 'Mo beneiit~(' in the fInal stage.
.' .-'
offered in the U.'5 ..
The ~esults ~rom the optimal insurance literature also imply
that the current' UI prograk: in the U'. S.' 'is exactly the oppos i te of
what it should b~. ~y'6i~etinib~nef{~s'for the first 26 weeks of
unemployment', the government is covering all' short spells of
unemployment ~nd' thus, all 'small 'losses. In addit,ion, by cutting
off benefits after 26' weeks the government is not providing
coVerage in the most 'itti~e:;rtant c'ases -- ones in which agents suffer
l~rge losses duet6 long spells of unemployment.
Is there a'T1Y way to deslg'n a UI program with a deductible?
"
which the governfuentoffef~very low (or zero) benefits during the
first sta'ge ofunempl'oyment, followed by a higher replacement in
the second stage that lasts for a considerable length of time,
, ,"
to ke~p the replacement rate relatively low. This explains why we
find ~ptimal' replacement rates at'T or below the current rates
ional benefits. First, it would end the government
subsidization of temporary lay6ffsby'fir.s'. Forq~ite some time
economists have argued that since ur is,not completely experienced
firms have an incentive to, exploit the .system by temporarily
ing off workers and then recalling ~hem as their benefits
ire. Some authors have estimated-that as many as 25-50% of all
layoffs in the u.S. can be explained 'in ,this 'ma~ner (see, for
example, Anderson and Meyer 1995 or Topel ). However, if laid-
off workers receive little or no benefi:ts durIng the initial satges
of unemployment, they would have an incentive to move on and seek
new jobs rather than wait for recall. 'And, if workers are
unwilling to wait for the firm to recall them, then the firms will
be less likely to lay them off i.nitially.,
The second benefit of such a 'progra~ is that it would
discourage those who attempt to exploit ,the system (slollchers).
with a substantial waiting per'i.od, before': ur begins or low
replacement rates during the initial stages of ,unemployment, agents
who would like to live off of the dole would have to pay a
substantial penalty in order collect the higher replacement rates
that would be offered to the long term unemployed. Therefore, such
a program should SUbstantially. reduce the number of, slouchers in
the system.
At this point it is useful,to emphasize that previous results
have hinted that such a "deductible" program might be more
efficient than current U1 ,programs. Figure 1, which shows the
conjectured optimal benefit path when agents can save and affect
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their probability of reemployment has this flavor -- benefits are
initially low to encourage search and then rise as savings are
depleted in order to allow workers to smooth con~umption.
O'Leary's (1994) empirical results that short spells of
unemployment are currently over compensated while long spells are
under compensated is also consistent with this type of policy
shift. Finally, Wang and Williamson (1995) have argued for a
benefit path similar to the one depicted in Figure 1 along with
reemployment bonuses as part of an optimal UI program.
The results of wang and Williamson (1995) are especially
worthy of review, given their similarity to ours. In their paper,
they solve for the optimal benefit path and consumption stream when
agents face randomness in employment. Thus, they allow the
government to subsidize or tax movements into various labor market
states (by choosing consumption) in addition to setting the benefit
path. As noted above, they do not model firms and therefore do not
capture the job destruction effects of UI. Nevertheless, their
resul ts have the same flavor as ours. Our Figures' 2 and 3 are
(slightly modified) reproductions of Figures 17 and 21 from their
paper. Figure 2 shows the optimal benefit path as a function of
the length of the spell of unemployment with one uni t of time
equally one quarter of a year. Note the non-monotionicity of the
benefit path -- benefits are lower in the first quarter th~n the
second quarter. In addition, note the generousity of the system
the replacement rate remains above 50% for over 5 quarters!
Figure 3 shows consumption across the spell of employment. It
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is important to note that consumption in the first period after
reemployment is much higher than it is in all subsequent periods
there is a reemployment bonus. This bonus provides workers with an
extra incentive to seek reemployment in the early stages of
unemployment by rewarding those who find new jobs. Without such a
bonus, the deductible that workers would have to pay in the first
period of unemployment (as represented by the low replacement rate
in the first quarter of unemployment) would be higher (so that the
replacement rate in the first quarter would be lower).
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Table 1
optimal UI Programs with Slouchers but No Professionals
Square-root utility
n
• 9
. 8
• 7
a o
(61%, 26)
(61%, 26)
(61%, 26)
.01
(59%, 24)
(60%, 22)
(58%, 22)
.02
(56%, 22)
(55%, 20)
(54%, 18)
.05
(48%, 16)
(42%, 14)
(36%, 12)
a o
(61%, 26)
(64%, 28)
(66%, 32)
(68%, 36)
.01
(60%, 22)
(60%, 26)
(63%, 28)
(67%, 32)
.02·
(55%, 20)
(57%, 22)
(61%, 24)
(64%, 28)
.05
(42%, 14)
(45%, 14)
(47%, 16)
(51%, 18)
Table 2
optimal DI Programs with Professionals and Slouchers
Square-root utility
n = .8 in all cells
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